I. Additional Tables
This section of the online appendix presents additional tables mentioned in the paper:
1. Table A1 . Pre-Fee Return Performance by Asset Class: First Subsample (March 1984 -March 1994 2. Table A2 . Pre-Fee Return Performance by Asset Class: Second Subsample (April 1994 -March 2004 Tables A1 and A2 look at the performance of the fund managers when the sample period is split into two halves. The alpha estimates are on average higher in the second subsample than the first. One possible explanation for this is that the proportion of specialist managers in the dataset is much higher in the second period than the first and the proportion of balanced managers is correspondingly lower. Since specialist managers are appointed because of their anticipated superior investment skills over those of balanced managers, the switch from specialist to balanced managers over the sample period would appear to be a rational decision by pension fund sponsors.
3. Table A3 . Annual Fees by Mandate and Asset Class Table A3 shows the distribution of annual fees by asset class and mandate type. The fees are generally higher for specialist and multi-asset managers than for balanced managers.
Table APre-Fee Measures of Security Selection and Market Timing Skills by Mandate
Type: First Subsample (March 1984 -March 1994 5. Table A5 . Pre-Fee Measures of Security Selection and Market Timing Skills by Mandate Type: Second Subsample (April 1994 -March 2004 Tables A4 and A5 look at the active management skills of the fund managers when the sample period is split into two halves. The total performance of specialist and multi-asset managers is generally higher in the second subsample than the first. The total performance of balanced managers is not statistically different from zero in both periods.
6. Tables A6 -A8 reports some robustness checks of the performance evaluation models. Table A6 shows the results from including an international equity factor in the U.K. equities model, an international bond factor in the U.K. bonds model, and a U.S. momentum factor in the international equities model. Table A7 shows the results from including timing factors for the Fama-French and momentum factors in the U.K. equities model. Table A8 shows the results from including timing factors for the market and Fama-French factors in the international equities model. In general, the additional factors do not make a significant qualitative difference to our results.
9. Table A9 . Pre-Fee Persistence in Performance by Mandate Type Table A9 tests for the persistence in above-median performance over non-overlapping 3-year periods. Specialist and multi-asset managers generally show statistically significant persistence in performance in Jensen's alpha, market timing and in the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) total performance measure. Balanced managers, by contrast, typically have no persistence in performance under any of these measures.
10. Table A10 . Pre-Fee Persistence in Performance by Mandate Type: Tercile and Decile
Results
Table A10 looks at performance persistence in more detail by sorting the managers into terciles or deciles and then recording their performance in the first and second period. The table shows, for example, that the percentage of specialist managers in U.K. equities with alphas in the top tercile in the first period who retain their top position in the second period is 47% and this is statistically significantly higher than the 33% who would be expected to stay in the top tercile by chance. The corresponding figure for balanced managers is just 33%. The tercile alpha, market-timing and TM performance persistence of specialists generally exceeds that of balanced managers in all three asset classes. The decile results are less clearcut, except for the performance persistence of the alphas. Table A11 presents the results from a logit model explaining the probability of switching from single to multiple managers (in each asset class) in terms of fund size and past performance. The estimation strategy uses time-fixed effects. Increasing fund size is a strong predictor of this type of switch in the three main classes, but especially in U.K.
bonds. Poor past performance also increases the probability of switching from single to multiple managers.
12. Table A12 . Pre-Fee Performance, Fund Size and the Number of Managers Table A12 presents the results from a two-stage procedure capturing the effect of fund size and number of managers on fund performance. Panel A shows that there is evidence of pre-fee diseconomies-of-scale at the fund level in seven of nine asset-class/mandate types. However, the effect is economically small; for instance, a fund/balanced manager pairing in U.K. equities that is 10 times the size of another such pairing exhibits an estimated relative alpha decrease of only about 16 bps/year. Second, there is no evidence that a larger number of managers results in increased pre-fee performance, as indicated by the largely negative values of the regression coefficient, γ. In Panel B we find statistically significant evidence of economies-of-scale at the fund management company (FMC) level, since five out of nine coefficients, δ, are positive and significant at the 1% confidence level. This suggests that large FMCs do provide better performance. We also find that there is evidence of a positive competition effect among specialists, as the coefficient, γ, is positive and economically large for each asset class (and is highly significant in the case of U.K. bonds, where a fund moving from one to two managers experiences an increase in risk-adjusted return of 52 bps/yr). However, there is no consistent positive competition effect among multiple managers operating under either multi-asset or balanced mandates, again indicating that skills, even under competition, are only prevalent among specialist managers. Note: This table presents the raw return performance as well as the risk-adjusted return performance for the three main asset classes held by the pension funds, namely U.K. equities, U.K. bonds and international equities. All results are based on quarterly data over the period from 1984-1994. Panel A reports percentiles for the distribution of mean returns measured across funds. Panels B and C present alpha and beta estimates. For U.K. equities, we use a four-factor model that includes the return on a broad market portfolio, a size factor, a value factor and a momentum factor. For U.K. bonds, we use a two-factor model that includes the returns on a broad market portfolio of U.K. government bonds and on U.K. government perpetual bonds (consols). Finally, for international equities, we use a four-factor model based on return indices for North America and the Europe Australasia Far Eastern Ex U.K. (EAFEX) area, augmented by a size and a small cap factor. These are Equations (1) - (3) in Section II.B. All returns are measured in percent per annum. The columns "mean" and "mean w " report simple and value-weighted average fees. Note: This table reports evidence of security selection and market timing skills for three types of manager, namely specialists, multi-asset managers (managing more than one asset class, but fewer than all asset classes) and balanced managers (managing all asset classes). For each mandate type, we show the average estimates of Jensen's alpha from the factor models for each asset class described in Equations (1) - (3) in Section II.B. Finally, we report the beta coefficient on the market-timing term along with the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) total performance measure. P -values are based on a non-parametric bootstrap that uses a one-sided test for the ability of funds to generate alphas, betas or TM measures in excess of the mean values estimated using the actual data sample. Jensen's alphas and the TM measures are reported in percent per annum. Note: This table reports evidence of security selection and market timing skills for three types of manager, namely specialists, multi-asset managers (managing more than one asset class, but fewer than all asset classes) and balanced managers (managing all asset classes). For each mandate type, we show the average estimates of Jensen's alpha from the factor models for each asset class described in Equations (1) - (3) in Section II.B. Finally, we report the beta coefficient on the market-timing term along with the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) total performance measure. P -values are based on a non-parametric bootstrap that uses a one-sided test for the ability of funds to generate alphas, betas or TM measures in excess of the mean values estimated using the actual data sample. Jensen's alphas and the TM measures are reported in percent per annum. Table 3 in the main paper: i.e., it reports evidence of security selection and market timing skills for three types of manager, namely specialists, multi-asset managers (managing more than one asset class, but fewer than all asset classes) and balanced managers (managing all asset classes). The U.K. equity factor model reported as Equation (1) in Section II.B in the main paper is augmented with an international equity factor, the U.K. bond factor model reported as Equation (2) is augmented with an international bond factor and the international equities factor model reported as Equation (3) is augmented with the U.S. momentum factor from Fama and French (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html). For each mandate type we show the average estimates of Jensen's alpha, the beta coefficient on the market-timing term along with the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) total performance measure. P -values are based on a non-parametric bootstrap that uses a one-sided test for the ability of funds to generate alphas, betas or TM measures in excess of the mean values estimated using the actual data sample. Jensen's alphas and the TM measures are reported in percent per annum. Note: This table reports evidence of security selection and market timing skills for three types of manager, namely specialists, multi-asset managers (managing more than one asset class, but fewer than all asset classes) and balanced managers (managing all asset classes). For each mandate type, we show the average estimates of Jensen's alpha, the beta coefficient on the market-timing term and the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) total performance measure. The factor models used are variations of the U.K. equities model reported in Equation (1) Note: This table reports evidence of security selection and market timing skills for three types of manager, namely specialists, multi-asset managers (managing more than one asset class, but fewer than all asset classes) and balanced managers (managing all asset classes). For each mandate type, we show the average estimates of Jensen's alpha, the beta coefficient on the market-timing term and the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) total performance measure. The factor models used are variations of the international equities model reported in Equation (3) in Section II.B., where we test for timing in the NA, EAFEX, SMB and HML factors in the panels from left to right. P -values are based on a non-parametric bootstrap that uses a one-sided test for the ability of funds to generate alphas, betas or TM measures in excess of the mean values estimated using the actual data sample. Jensen's alphas and the TM measures are reported in percent per annum. Note: This table reports the results from a regression of an indicator tracking above-median performance (estimated over a three-year period) for a particular fund/manager pairing on a constant and the fund/manager pairing's prior performance (estimated over the previous three-year period).
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The performance is based on the following equation (in the case of U.K. equities):
There are similar equations described in the text for U.K. bonds and international equities. We estimate the following: 
p-value Avg.
p-value Note: The performance is based on the following equation (in the case of U.K. equities):
There are similar equations described in the text for U.K. bonds and international equities. We compute the frequency of equal alpha/markettiming/TM tercile (decile) rank for consecutive sub-periods for each fund/manager pairing and we average the results across funds and managers pairings. We then conduct a test of whether the conditional probability of staying in the same tercile (decile) is greater than Note: This table reports the results of a logit model of a fund's probability of switching from employing a single to multiple managers in a given asset class as a function of the fund's size (δ) and past performance (γ). Size is measured as the log fund size relative to the average fund size across all funds in existence at time t. Performance is measured as the average annual return in excess of the benchmark for each fund over the course of the previous year. Time-fixed effects are used. Panel A reports aggregate results while Panel B reports the results for specialist, multi-asset and balanced mandates, respectively. Note: This table presents the results from a two-stage procedure capturing the effect of fund size and number of managers on fund performance. First, we compute risk-adjusted returns using the factor models for each asset class described in the note to Table 2 . In Panel A, we present a measure of risk-adjusted returns that controls for managers' skills across funds and we regress this measure on the log fund-size relative to the average fund size and a variable indicating the number of managers active in each asset class, without including a constant. In Panel B, we regress risk-adjusted returns on a constant, the log size of the manager across all funds and a variable indicating the number of managers active in each asset class. The coefficient for the size variable is δ, while the coefficient for the number of managers is γ.
II. Simulating Segregated Fund Manager Fees
The actual fees charged by fund managers to institutional clients such as pension funds under segregated mandates are not publicly disclosed. We therefore had to construct a set of simulated fund manager fees for each pension fund mandate using a dataset provided by Defaqto on retail investment fees charged by the same fund managers. Most fund managers manage both retail and institutional funds. We then used the Mercer (2006) if there are economies of scale in fees). We then adjust the fee for each fund manager as follows:
F ee
Def aqto, AU M adjusted i,j = F ee
where AU M j is the median fund size across fund managers in asset class j. This adjustment assumes that any scale effects are constant across managers within each asset class.
Having constructed the size-adjusted management fee for a retail product for each FMC for each of the seven CAPS asset classes, we rescale the retail fees into segregated institutional fees using the Mercer global investment management fee survey. The Mercer report is an anonymous bi-annual survey of fees on more than 20,000 asset management products from over 4,000 FMCs. The survey covers both pooled retail and separately managed segregated accounts, and provides estimates of the distribution of fees charged in a range of mandate size bands (<£25m, £50m, £75m, £100m, £150m, £200m, and >£250m). The survey reveals that fund management fees typically exhibit economies of scale with lower fee rates for larger mandate sizes.
In order to maintain the cross-sectional dispersion in fees derived from the Defacto dataset, we calculate the spreads between the 95th and 5th percentiles for each asset class j for both the Defacto and Mercer datatsets: Spread . Using these, we define
We derived the 2004 (end of sample) adjusted management fee for fund manager i in asset class j for a mandate of median size as:
F ee mean and spread as in the Mercer survey. We winsorize the resulting distribution so that fund managers whose fees are below the 5% level have their fees set equal to the 5% level.
Similarly, fund managers whose fees are above the 95% level have their fees set equal to those of the 95% ranked fund manager. Equation (A2) allows us to simulate segregated fund manager fees over the sample 1998-2004. Table A13 shows the distribution of these simulated fees by mandate type (balanced and specialist), and for the specialist mandates by sector. The numbers in the table are annual fees in basis points, so that the average fee for balanced mandates is 34 basis points per annum (0.34%) and N is the number of fund-quarter observations from 1984-2004. Equation (A1) makes no allowance for any time trend in fees or for the size of the pension fund mandate. We need to make adjustments for both of these effects. To obtain projections in fees back in time from 2004, we applied the time trend in pension fund fees reported in French (2008, Table III , Investment Management Cost in DB Plans) assuming this trend is the same for all managers in a given asset class:
French (2008) We now match these simulated fees for each fund manager to the individual fund manager mandates in the CAPS dataset. For any mandates for which a matching retail fund manager is not available (which covers about 40 per cent of observations), we assume that they charge the median fee for that asset class. To allow for economies of scale in the mandate size, we again use the Mercer survey which shows the fee as a function of size of mandate. We convert all fund sizes (i.e., starting market values or smv) in our CAPS dataset to 2004 pounds sterling.
For every quarter, we compute the median smv value in 2004 pounds sterling and use the corresponding range of mandate size bands from the Mercer data to match the fees. Table   A14 shows the distribution of fees as a function of mandate size for each asset class from the Mercer survey. Specialist Mandates Bonds  40  27  23  22  21  20  19  UK Equities  75  70  60  56  52  50  49  Cash  19  14  13  13  12  12  12  Index-Linked Bonds  30  23  20  19  18  17  17  Property  20  23  25  25  25  25  25  International Bonds  47  42  37  36  33  30  29  International Equities  74  68  61  58  53  50  50 Finally, we compute an AUM-adjustment factor for individual fund manager i by calculating the difference between the median fee for the corresponding mandate and the median mandate in asset class j:
where F ee
is the median fee in the Mercer survey for that fund's mandate size band and F ee M ercer median (AU M j ) is the median fee in the Mercer survey at the median AU M j value for asset class j. Adding (A2) -(A4), we obtain the simulated instutional fee derived from the rescaled retail fee with appropriate trend and size adjustments:
These fees are simulated for each of the 535,080 mandate-quarters in the CAPS dataset. 3 The mean fee for cash lies outside the interquartile range; this is explained by a small number of retail fund managers in the Defaqto datset charging very high fees in this asset class
II.A. Comparison with Other Sources of Pension Fund Fees
In order to assess how closely our simulated fees correspond with actual fees, we present some survey evidence on pension fund fees for segregated mandates.
II.A.1. Myners Report 2001
In 2001, HM Treasury sponsored a study of institutional fund management. Table A16 is taken   from Table 5 .3 in Myners (2001) and reports the ranges of fees charged in different countries for £100 million segregated pension fund mandates in equities and bonds, respectively.
The columns in Table A16 indicate median fees of 40 basis points per annum for a U.K.
equity mandate and 18 basis points per annum for a U.K. bond mandate. These fees are within 2 basis points of those reported in Table A15 . The distribution of fees for these two asset classes are also similar as can be seen by comparing fees at the 25, 50 and 75 percentile Table A15 and (30: 40: 48 ) from the Myners Report in Table A16 ).
II.A.2. Morningstar Pension Fund Fee Survey
We were able to obtain information from Morningstar on a survey that they undertake on an annual basis of fees charged by fund managers of segregated pension fund mandates by size of mandate. Summary data from this survey by asset class is given in Table A17 . Comparing Table A17 with the simulated fees in Table A14 , we observe that, for balanced mandates, our simulated fees are slightly lower than those in the Morningstar survey. The simulated specialist fees for U.K. bonds, international bonds and international equities are very similar to those in the Morningstar survey, while the simulated specialist fees for U.K.
equity mandates are slightly higher than those in the Morningstar survey.
III. Summary of a Survey of Pension Fund Industry Professionals
We conducted a survey at the request of the Editor to assess whether our interpretations of the findings in our paper were consistent with views held by pension fund industry professionals.
The survey was conducted in July and August 2011 by telephone or written response. We interviewed a total of 9 professionals, comprising 2 representatives from pension funds (a senior manager and a head of innovation), 2 pension fund investment managers, 2 consultants, the head of research and a senior investment adviser at a trade association representing investment managers, and a senior policy adviser at a trade association representing pension funds.
We summarise here the responses to 7 questions that we asked.
1. In your experience, why do pensions funds decentralize? Is it purely performance-related or are there other considerations?
The consensus (supported by 8 out of 9 respondents) is that decentralization is mainly performance related: it is hard to find one balanced fund manager with skills across all assets classes. However, there also seems to be an unwillingness to fire managers.
"It began in the late 70s/early 80s and was largely performance related. It began to be recognized that you could not be an expert in all asset classes. Having one manager managing the whole fund meant putting all your eggs in one basket. What do you do when some asset classes are underperforming? Peer-group performance assessment was coming to an end and U.K. pension funds could now invest overseas. It began to be recognized that there were centres of excellence in different investment management houses and pension funds began to seek the best in class for each asset category. This coincided with the switch to external market benchmarks in each asset class" (Head of research at a fund managers trade association).
Although fund managers do get fired, there appears to be a reluctance to sack managers.
So instead of sacking a poorly performing manager, an additional manager is hired. There appear to be strong behavioural reasons for this approach: "The trustees and decision makers want to avoid 'finger print risk '. They want to create a distance between the outcome and their responsibility for it. We hired the best fund managers: if they can't get it right, who can? Don't blame us. The trustees try to create a Teflon shield to protect themselves" (Pension fund).
"Consultants drive change" (Fund manager) and since they will be making the same recommendation to trustees in different plans at the same time, the whole decentralization process will happen at the same time. "Some consultants have set up a manager-of-manager service and so will be recommending use of this service" (Fund manager) which again encourages decentralization.
2. Does the pension fund's chief investment officer and/or consultant consider shifts in risk when decentralizing? How do they monitor and control this? Is it purely through tracking error?
All respondents agreed that using multiple managers helps to diversify risk as well as improve performance:
• "Employing managers with different styles will result in lower risk " (Fund manager).
• "The key is to diversify across manager risk -this is a big driver " (Fund manager).
• "The introduction of specialists should lead to better performance overall for the fund (net of fees). This is related to alpha-beta separation. Where markets are regarded as efficient, e.g., U.K./U.S. large cap equities, the trend is to go for passive mandates.
This leaves specialists in less efficient asset classes who are given high-alpha mandates.
Portfolio alpha should go up if this strategy is successful " (Head of research at a fund managers trade association).
There is less agreement on how risks are monitored and controlled and the role of tracking error in this:
• "Tracking error is the principal measure used to monitor and control risk " (Consultant).
"Large funds will have a risk measurement system that monitors the performance of the fund managers on a daily basis and controls through tracking error against the contracted mandate" (Fund manager).
• "Tracking error can actually undermine active management. This is because it is difficult to get alpha outperformance when there is a cap on tracking error. This has led to unconstrained portfolio management. Performance will still be measured relative to an index but will not be constrained by a tracking error limit on the benchmark. For example, the target might be an index + 2%. This would be hard to achieve if there was a tracking error constraint that effectively forced you to hold stocks in the index that you did not want to hold " (Head of research at a fund managers trade association).
• "Tracking error is useless. If you want to redeploy risk to give a higher return, your positions will be negatively correlated with the index. The incremental risk from doing this will be low, but the tracking error will be high. For example, during the tech stock bubble, the index was volatile and overvalued, so shorting tech stocks reduced risk, but increased tracking error " (Fund manager).
Some respondents preferred other risk measures, such as VaR-related measures, to tracking error. "Instead, look at how the new position incrementally adds to (or reduces) risk.
Also look at tail loss or expected shortfall in a VaR context. Also look at leverage (short cash) especially when doing ALM. Cash is not the risk free asset in ALM. So being short cash and going long bonds can reduce risk on an ALM basis" (Fund manager).
However, it is also recognized that "small funds can't really control for risks: they will just be sent performance results once a quarter and that is that" (Fund manager). "For very small funds, the consultant will recommend that they get out of the big decision business. We will help with the SAA, but then you go passive on the rest" (Consultant).
3. Why do funds go from balanced to specialist managers? Is it driven by performance in a particular dominant asset class, such as U.K. equities (i.e., does the CIO decide to switch to specialists mainly as a result of poor existing performance in the dominant asset class) or are there other reasons?
There appears to be a variety of reasons for this, of which poor performance in an asset class (and not necessarily the dominant one) is just one:
• "Underperformance in U.K. equities led to the beginning of the trend towards specialists"
(Head of research at a fund managers trade association).
• "Poor performance is usually first recognized in one of the smaller asset classes such as international equities which prompts the decision to look for a specialist there first" (Consultant).
• "When an industry grows and matures, it specializes. It is natural to decentralize" (Fund manager).
• "Specialists serve the consulting model. They decide who gets what. Blame avoidance (for the consultants) is also critical " (Fund manager).
• "The unbundling of fees: until the late 80s, one fee covered everything; but with unbundling, consultants were aware of specialist managers for specialist tasks, at difference prices" (Fund manager).
• "Changes in key personnel at a particular asset manager can also impact on the retention/removal of investment managers over time" (Senior policy advisor at a trade association representing pension funds).
• "In our case, it is driven by the risk budget. We make the policy decision as to which markets we will be passive in and which active. The U.S. public equities market will be passively managed, since we do not believe that we will have any comparative advantage in picking winners. But we will be active in Canadian and European equities and so we will allocate some of the risk budget to these two sectors. This allocation of the risk budget will, in turn, be used to decide on the specialist active manager to appoint for Canadian and European equities" (Pension fund).
Developments on the liability side are also important:
• "Better liability management (separation of matching and alpha components) and more confidence in meeting alpha targets could lead to a switch to specialists" (Consultant).
• "A big change in strategic asset allocation, say from equities to bonds as a result of the maturity of a pension plan, would be used as an opportunity to switch to specialist managers" (Head of research at a fund managers trade association).
• "After a certain size, funds consider splitting. But danger of overdiversifying and paying higher fees than you need " (Consultant).
• "There are economies of scale in fees, but that might not compensate for poor performance as a result of fund size" (Head of research at a fund managers trade association).
• "There is certainly recognition about economies in fees, but [we] will not let that override a belief that there would be better performance if the fund was spread over a number of managers" (Pension fund)
A dissenting view was this: "Beware when it comes to causality issues related to scale.
Large funds can get access to more opportunities, but small funds can be more nimble.
The quality of the board of trustees (i.e., the quality of governance) is potentially more important than size. A small fund could do better than a large fund if it has good trustees and vice versa. In general, though, the quality of the trustees is poor " (Pension fund).
"No rules of thumb about switching -consultants will advise" (Fund manager).
7. Are the above decisions made solely internally within each fund or is there evidence of copycat or herding behaviour?
There is a clear consensus (by 6 out of 9 respondents) on herding behaviour and also on who is responsible for the herding behaviour:
• "Yes, herding is reinforced by investment consultants" (Fund manager).
• "The U.K. market is most intermediated in the world -the investment consultants drove almost all of this and there was definite herding there! " (Consultant).
• "Herding is very important due to both career risk and business risk. Failure is very visible. In practice it is very difficult to deviate. There is a gravity pull towards the average. It is the industrial packaging approach to investment management: do not take too much risk and do not end up in the lower end of the rankings" (Pension fund).
Some respondents had different views:
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• "If there are good governance structures in place, then a pension fund would only be looking at its own liabilities which is a purely internal analysis. With other funds, there is a lot of peer-group obsession. We do not want to look different" (Consultant).
• "There is a question mark over what herding actually means. If there is a paradigm shift towards LDI, does this mean everyone is herding if they switch at the same time? " (Head of research at a fund managers trade association).
